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Abstract This paper analyzes the system of modality marking in Daakie, an Aus-
tronesian (Oceanic) language spoken on Ambrym (Vanuatu). Daakie has a five-
way distinction that expresses both temporal and modal notions. In addition to a
realis marker there is a potentialis marker for events that are expected to happen,
a distal marker for temporally or modally remote events, a realis negation, and a
potentialis negation. These markers are used in main and dependent clauses,
where they express factive and negative interpretations.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I will describe and analyze the modality system of the language
Daakie, also known as Port Vato (ISO 639-3 ptv, Glottolog port1286). Daakie is
spoken by about 1000 persons on the southern coast of the island of Ambrym,
Vanuatu; it is an Austronesian, specifically Oceanic, language belonging to the
Central Vanuatu subgroup. The data is based on documentary field work from
2010 to 2016, resulting in about 8 hours of transcribed spoken materials, and ad-
ditional written texts and translations by native speakers. There is no grammatical
description of Daakie, but there is a comprehensive grammar of the closely re-
lated language Daakaka spoken immediately to the West (von Prince 2015); a pre-
liminary analysis of the modality system was presented by Krifka (2012). This
system is typical for Oceanic languages in Melanesia in exhibiting a Realis–Irre-
alis distinction (see de Haan 2012 for a typological overview of such systems).
Finite verbs in Daakie are preceded by a modal marker that is suffixed to the
subject marker that expresses agreement with the subject in person and number
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(1st/2nd/3r d and 1+2nd person; singular, dual, paucal, and plural number). In the 3rd
person singular, there is no subject agreement, and the modal marker surfaces in a
bare form, which varies depending on the phonological shape of the following
verb. There are five modal markers: Realis (-m), Realis Negation (-re), Potentialis
(-p or b-), Potentialis Negation (-n) and Distal (-t).
2 Modeling assumptions
I assume a frame of branching times/worlds (cf. Dowty 1977), as this captures the
temporal and the modal use of the modal markers. It consists of a set I of world-
time indices i, i′ etc. that are partially ordered by a relation ≤ of temporal prece -
dence; i ≤ i′ means i = i′ or i precedes i′, and i ~ i′ holds iff i and i′ are indices on
the same branch. Linear intervals of indices are called histories.
(1) a. I: set of world-time indices, with partial order ≤ (precedence)
b. i ~ i′ iff i ≤ i′ or i′ ≤ i 
c. h ⊆ I is a history iff  ∀i,i′[[i∈h ∧ i′∈h → i ~ i′] ∧ ∀i″[i ≤ i″ ≤ i′ → i″∈h]]
The semantic representation of the modal markers will make use of potentially
undefined values, which require a trivalent logic with values true 1, false 0, and
undefined *. We define operators for truth, definedness and semantic presupposi -
tion, where the latter is understood as condition for definedness.1
(2) a. ! Φ =def 1 if Φ = 1, =def 0 iff Φ = 0 or Φ = * (‘it is true that Φ’)
b. $ Φ =def 1 if Φ = 1 or Φ = 0, =def 0 if Φ = * (‘Φ is defined’)
c. :Φ =def 1 if Φ = 1, =def * iff Φ = 0 or Φ = * (‘it is presupposed that Φ’)
Basic formulas are defined; undefinedness arises due to the presupposition opera-
tor. For ordinary connectives, I assume Kleene’s weak trivalent logic, which states
that ¬Φ is undefined iff Φ is undefined, and [Φ ∧/∨/→/↔ Ψ] is undefined iff Φ or
Ψ are undefined. I will write [:π Φ] for [:π ∧ Φ], i.e. for a formula Φ with presup-
position π. We have the following rules for undefinedness:
(3) a. ¬[:π Φ] ≡ [:π ¬Φ] b. [:π Φ ∧/∨/→/↔ :π′ Φ′] ≡ [:[π∧π′] Φ ∧/∨/→/↔ Φ′]
c. ::Φ ≡ :Φ d. [:Φ Φ] ≡ :Φ e. !:Φ ≡ !Φ
f. !Φ ≡ Φ, if Φ is undefined, i.e. contains no part :Ψ
I assume restricted quantification, which ensures that undefinedness has an ef -
fect only in the scope Ψ, not in the restrictor Φ, where it is treated as falsity:
1 This notion of undefinedness cannot cover the notion of pragmatic presupposition, as being es -
tablished in the common ground. In particular, Kleene’s weak projection rules do not predict
the projection rules of pragmatic presuppositions (cf. Beaver 1997). 
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(4) a. ∀x: Φ(x) [Ψ(x)] =def ∀x [!Φ(x) → Ψ(x)]
b. ∃x: Φ(x) [Ψ(x)] =def ∃x [!Φ(x) ∧ Ψ(x)]
This results in the projection rules (5), where a presupposition of the nuclear
scope turns into a universal presupposition for the restrictor, both for ∀ and ∃.
(5) a. ∀x: Φ(x) [:π(x) Ψ(x)] ≡ [: ∀x:Φ(x)[π(x)] ∀x: Φ(x) [Ψ(x)]]
b. ∃x: Φ(x) [:π(x) Ψ(x)] ≡ [: ∀x:Φ(x)[π(x)] ∃x: Φ(x) [Ψ(x)]] 
3 Realis -m / m(w)V
Realis is the most frequent modality in the text corpus. In main clauses, it is used
to refer to ongoing, cf. (6), or past, cf. (7), events and states.2
(6) Obwet an    vu mi   myuu mo do
taro CL2-3S  introduced RE   grow RE slow
‘The Fiji taro is growing slow’, speaker is pointing at a plant (Jemis2.054)
(7) Meerin na-m  mee o-ke-lé na-m lehe
long.time.ago1S-RE  come LOC-CP-PROX 1S-RE look
‘Long time ago I came, I looked’, narrative (Bong2.027)
In embedded clauses, realis is used when the embedded clause is taken to be
true by the speaker. Such factive clauses have a complementizer ke. This is illus-
trated with complement clauses (perception, cf. (8), and epistemic, cf. (9)) and ad-
junct clauses (reason, cf. (10) and temporal, cf. (11)). 
(8) kolo-m lehe  ke m-aloo em mwe sanga ten
3DU-re see     [CP.RE CL3-DU house RE bad very]
‘The two saw that their house was very bad.’, trad. story (Bong4.049)
(9) kolo-re kiibele  ke kolo-m du taali lii-byak kiye
3DU-RNEG know    [CP.RE 3DU-RE stay other.TR tree=nambanga DEF.3SG]
‘The two did not know that they were staying at opposite sides of the nam-
banga tree’, sanddrawing story (Ilson 3.005)
2 I follow the orthography of Daakie that was developed in the documentation project. Glosses:
RE realis, POT potentialis, RNEG realis negation, PNEG potentialis negation, DIST distal,
FUT future, first person, 2 second person, 3 third person, 1+2 first/second person inclusive, SG
singular, DU dual, PC paucal, PL plural, CL1/2/3 possessive classes, CP and CP.RE realis
complemetizer, CP.NRE nonrealis complementizer, LOC reference to location, PROX proxi -
mate, COP copula, TR transitive, REDUP reduplication, NOMIN nominalizer, NRE nonrealis,
IDEF indefinite, PART partitive. The references are to the corpus of Daakie, mostly transcribed
recordings of video recordings that are available on request and that will be made accessible at
the TLA database at https://tla.mpi.nl/. 
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(10) na-m pwet hospital byen ke  popat  mwe  te ye-k
1SG-RE stay hospital   [because CP.RE  pig  RE  cut leg-1SG]
‘I stayed in the hospital because the pig cut my leg.’, pers. story (Boa1.079)
(11) bili ke la-m   seene   meleh me van mo sók=tahe nane popat
[time CP.RE 3PL-RE throw.TR food RE go] RE   take=again from pig
‘When they threw food inside he took it again from the pigs.’ (PSak2.025)
The complementizer ke also occurs in relative clauses, as in (12), which also
illustrates a potentialis clause with a non-realis complementizer, ka.
(12) pune=n ke na-m longbini ka   na-p pune
tell=NOMIN CP.RE 1SG-RE want CP.NR  1SG-POT tell
‘the story that I want to tell’, trad. story (Bong1.092)
Realis clauses make a new contribution to the common ground as root clauses
but signal factivity as embedded clauses. I propose that they contain a realis pre -
supposition, viz. they mark that their host proposition is in fact true. It might seem
that then they cannot be used in an informative way. However, notice that a
speaker has a choice of either asserting a realis clause, or not to assert it, and so its
assertion is informative. What a speaker cannot do is to assert its negation, as this
would conflict with its presupposition; cf. Section 4 for realis negation. 
I will discuss the different modalities with variations of the clause (13), for
which I assume the indicated syntactic structure. I assume that the subject of the
vP is moved to the specifier of the IP which carries a modal marker in its head, a
position at which agreement is expressed. The CP is headed by an existential clo -
sure operator ∃; in other clause types there is a complementizer. I also assume a
ForceP at which speech-act operators like Assertion are realized. 
(13) [ForceP ASSERT [CP  [C′ [Cº ∃ [IP Enet [I′ [Iº mo] [vP tEnet koliet]]]]]]
‘Enet is singing.’, ‘Enet sang.’
Interpretations of expressions are with respect to a context index c. Subject
movement is disregarded; the subject is interpreted in the position of its trace.
(14) a. ⟦[vP tEnet koliet]⟧(c) = λi[Enet sings at i], = φ, host proposition
b. ⟦[Iº -m]⟧(c) = λiλi′λp[:∃i′[:i′≤c p(i′)] [:i′≤i p(i)]], modal operator
c. ⟦[IP Enet [mo [tEnet koliet]]]⟧(c), modalized propositional relation
 = λiλi′[⟦[Iº mo⟧(c)(i)(i′)(⟦[vP tEnet koliet]⟧(c)(i))]
 = λiλi′[:∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] [:i′≤i φ(i′)]]
d. ⟦ ∃⟧(c) = λiλp∃i′[p(i′)]
e. ⟦[CP ∃ [IP Enet [mo [tEnet koliet]]]]⟧(c), modalized proposition
= λi[⟦ ∃⟧(c)(i)(⟦[IP Enet [mo [tEnet koliet]]]⟧(c)(i))]
= λi[:∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i φ(i′)]]
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Semantic composition is by functional application, whereby indices are pro-
jected. Application of a modal operator at the IP level leads to a propositional re -
lation between an index i to an index i′ at which the host proposition is true; I will
call i′ “event index” and i “reference index”. In the case of realis, it is presup-
posed that the host proposition is true at an index at or before the context c, and
that the event index is situated at or before the reference index. 
Assertion is modeled as an operation on common grounds C, the set of indices
compatible with the mutual shared knowledge of the interlocutors. To assert a CP
at C amounts to restricting C to the indices c for which the CP relation holds:
(15) ⟦ASSERT⟧(C) = λrλc[C(c) ∧ ! r(c)(c)]
(16) ⟦[ForceP ASSERT [CP Enet mo koliet]]⟧(C)
= ⟦ASSERT⟧(C)(⟦[CP Enet mo koliet]⟧)
= λrλc[C(c) ∧ ! r(c)(c)](λcλi[:∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i φ(i′)]])
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! [:∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)]]]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! ∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)]], cf. (3d,e)
= λc[C(c) ∧ ∃i′[i′≤c ∧ φ(i′)]], cf. (3f)
The truth operator ! in the definition of ASSERT prevents C from becoming
undefined. If for all c′ it holds that C(c′) ≠ *, then it will also hold that for all c′
that λc[C(c) ∧ !Φ(c)](c′) ≠ *, as !Φ(c′) ≠ *. Notice that the assertion (16) is infor-
mative: C is restricted to those indices c such that Enet sings at c or before c.
Let us now consider realis embedded clauses, with example (17), where the
complementizer ke is the head of the CP. I assume that ke expresses existential
closure, ∃; as ke is restricted to realis contexts, it expresses a realis presupposition,
cf. (18). It matches with the realis proposition, cf. (19). 
(17) [IP Lising mwi [vP tLising [VP kiibele [CP [Cº ke] [IP Enet mo koliet]]]]]
‘Lising knows/knew that Enet is/was singing.’
(18) ⟦ke⟧(c) = λiλp [:∃i′[:i′≤c p(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i p(i′)]]
(19) ⟦[CP ke [IP Enet mo koliet]]⟧(c)
= λi[⟦ke⟧(c)(i)](⟦[IP Enet mo koliet]⟧(c)(i))]
= λi[λp[:∃i′[:i′≤c p(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i ∧ p(i′)](λi′[:∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] [:i′≤i φ(i′)]])]
= λi[:∃i′[:i′≤c [:∃i′[i′≤c φ(i′)] [:i′≤i φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i [:∃i′[i′≤c φ(i′)] [:i′≤i φ(i′)]]]
= λi[:∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i φ(i′)]]
I assume a standard interpretation of kiibele as a propositional attitude verb;  it
expresses belief in a proposition that is presupposed to be true. To believe a
proposition Φ means that Φ is true at all indices that are compatible with one’s be -
liefs. We assume a doxastic operator to express belief, (20), and model knowledge
with a factive presupposition, (21): 
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(20) DOX(x)(i)(i′) iff i′ is compatible with the beliefs that x holds at i about i.
(21) ⟦kiibele⟧(c) = λiλpλx [:p(c) ∀i″:DOX(x)(i)(i″) p(i″)]
The interpretation of the VP of (17) is computed as in (22). F or the last step in
the derivation, notice that ∃i′≤c[φ(i′)] is independent of i″, hence this presupposi-
tion is projected, where it is consonant with the factive presupposition of kiibele.
(22) ⟦[VP kiibele [CP ke Enet mo koliet]]⟧(c)
= λi[⟦kiibele⟧(c)(i)(⟦[CP ke Enet mo koliet]⟧(c))]
= λiλx[:[:∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)]] 
   ∀i″:DOX(x)(i)(i″)[:∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i″ φ(i′)]]]
= λiλx[:∃i′[i′≤c[φ(i′)] ∀i″:DOX(x)(i)(i″) ∃i′[:i′≤i″ φ(i′)]]], cf. (3c,d, (5a)
In the next steps, the subject, modality and existential closure of the main
clause are supplied, cf. (23). When asserted, we get the change of an input com -
mon ground C in (24).
(23) ⟦[CP ∃ [IP Lising [mwi [vP tLising kiibele ke Enet mo koliet]]]]⟧
= λcλi [:∃i′[:i′≤c (22)(Lising)](i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i (22)(Lising)(i′)]]
(24) ⟦[ForceP ASSERT [CP Lising mwi kiibele ke Enet mo koliet]]⟧(C)
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! (23)(c)(c)]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! [:∃i′[i′≤c (22)(Lising)(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤c (22)(Lising)(i′)]]]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! ∃i′[:i′≤c (22)(Lising)(i′)]]], cf. (3d,e)
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! ∃i′[:i′≤c :∃i′≤c[φ(i′)] ∀i″:DOX(Lising)(i′)(i″) ∃i′[:i′≤i″ φ(i′)]]]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! [:∃i′≤c[φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤c ∀i″:DOX(Lising)(i′)(i″) ∃i′[:i′≤i″ φ(i′)]]]
= λc [C(c) ∧ ∃i′≤c[φ(i′)] ∧ ∃i′≤c ∀i″:DOX(Lising)(i′)(i″) ∃i′≤i″[φ(i′)]]
The realis presupposition :∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] of the embedded clause is projected,
following (3b). The output common ground (24) is such that at or before each c,
Enet sang; this captures the factivity of the embedded clause. In addition, at an in-
dex i′ at or before c, the doxastically accessible worlds i″ for Lising at i′ (the in -
dices compatible with Lising’s knowledge at i′ about i′) are such that Enet sings at
or before i″. Hence the assertion of (23) adds the information that Enet sings at or
before c, and that it is compatible with Lising’s beliefs at or before c that Enet
sings at or before any index i″ that Lising might take to be the context. 
The realis presupposition is also justified in reason and temporal clauses that
refer to past situations, cf. (10). (11). The reason clause (25), meaning ‘Enet is
singing/sang because Lising is dancing / danced’, is interpreted as in (26).
(25) [IP [IP Enet mo koliet] [AdvP byen ke Lising mwe sap]]
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(26) a. ⟦byen⟧(c) = λiλi′λpλr[r(i)(i′) ∧ p(i) ∧ ∀i″R(c)(i″)[¬q(i″) → ¬∃i′r(i″)(i′)]]]
b. ⟦[CP ke Lising mwe sap]⟧(c) = λi[:∃i′[:i′≤c ψ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i ψ(i′)]]
c. ⟦[AdvP byen [CP ke Lising mwe sap]]⟧(c)
= λiλi′[⟦byen⟧(c)(i)(i′)(⟦[CP ke Lising mwe sap]⟧(c))]
 = λiλi′λr[:∃i′[:i′≤c ψ(i′)] [r(i)(i′) ∧ ∃i′[:i′≤i ψ(i′)] 
 ∧ ∀i″R(c)(i″)[¬∃i′[:i′≤i″ ψ(i″)] → ¬∃i′r(i″)(i′)]]]
d. ⟦[IP [IP Enet mo koliet] [AdvP byen ke Lising mwe sap]]⟧(c)
= λiλi′[⟦[AdvP byen ke Lising mwe sap⟧(c)(i)(i′)(⟦[IP Enet mo koliet]⟧(c))]
 = λiλi′[:∃i′≤c[ψ(i′) :∃i′≤c[φ(i′)] [:i′≤i φ(i′)] ∧ ∃i′[i′≤i ψ(i′)] 
∧ ∀i″R(c)(i″)[¬∃i′[:i′≤i″ ψ(i″)] → ¬ ∃i′[:i′≤i″ φ(i′)]]]
The causal relation states that for all indices i″ in the accessibility relation R,
if there were no index i′ before i″ at which Lising dances, there would not be an
index i′ before i″ at which Enet sings. The negation leaves the presuppositions of
the two subclauses untouched, cf. (3a); they project, being are independent of i″,
and become presuppositions of the whole sentence, following (3b). 
4 Realis Negation -re / tere
We have seen that realis creates a presupposition that its host proposition is true at
the context index c or some index before c. Hence realis clauses cannot be
negated, as this would result in a proposition that is undefined at every index; as-
serting this proposition would reduce the common ground C to the empty set. So,
how is negation expressed? Narrow-scope negation over vP with subsequent re-
alis marking and existential closure leads to λi[:∃i′≤c[¬φ(i′)] ∃i′≤i[¬φ(i′)]] – not
what we want, because this just states that the host proposition φ was false at
some index before the reference/context index i. Rather, negation is expressed by
a separate modal operator in place of the realis operator, cf. example (9) and (27),
a sentence about former warfare between two villages that are now closely allied.
Realis negation also occurs in embedded clauses in factive contexts, i.e. in cases
in which it is presupposed that the host proposition is false, as in (28).
(27) Lalinda mane Langievot kolo-re   wu~wuo mane koloo
Lalinda with Langievot 3DU-RENEG  good.REDUP with 3DU
‘Lalinda and Langievot weren’t on good terms with each other’ (Andri.005)
(28) Taata  a-bwe kiibele ke ngyo na-re Isao
Father  FUT-POT know CP.RE 1SG 1SG-RENEG Esau
‘Father will know that I am not Esau’, translation (OT.353)
This suggests that realis negation negates its host proposition and presupposes
that the host proposition is false at the context index. This will be illustrated with
example (29), which is interpreted as first approximation as in (30).
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(29) [ForceP ASSERT [CP ∃ [IP Enet [I′ [Iº tere] [vP tEnet koliet]]]]]
‘Enet does not sing.’, ‘Enet did not sing’
(30) a. ⟦-re⟧(c) = λiλi′λp[:¬∃i′[:i′≤c p(i′)] [:i′≤i ¬p(i′)]]
b. ⟦[IP Enet [I′ [Iº tere] [vP tEnet koliet]]]⟧(c)
 = λiλi′[⟦-re⟧(c)(i)(i′)(⟦[vP tEnet koliet]⟧(c)(i))
 = λiλi′[:¬∃i′[:i′≤c φ(i′)] [:i′≤i ¬φ(i′)]]
c. ⟦[CP ∃ [IP Enet [I′ [Iº tere] [vP tEnet koliet]]]]⟧(c)
 = λi [⟦ ∃⟧(c)(⟦[IP Enet [I′ [Iº tere] [vP tEnet koliet]]]⟧(c)(i))]
= λi [:¬∃i′[i′≤c φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤i ¬φ(i′)]]
d. ⟦ASSERT⟧(C)(⟦[IP Enet tere tEnet koliet]⟧)
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! [:¬∃i′[i′≤c φ(i′)] ∃i′[:i′≤c ¬φ(i)]]
 = λc[C(c) ∧ ¬∃i′≤c[φ(i)]], cf. (3)(e)
Realis negation expresses an antifactive presupposition and negates the host
proposition, cf. (30a,b). Existential closure at the CP level then states that there is
an index i′ at or before i such that the host proposition is false, cf. (30c). After as -
sertion, cf. (30d), i is identified with c, and this existential claim becomes trivial
under the antifactive presupposition. The presupposition is turned to a regular
meaning due to !, and the common ground C is restricted to those indices c for
which it holds that there is no preceding or equal index i′ at which Enet sings. 
The analysis of realis negation has to be refined in one important aspect. For
(27) it would imply that the two villages are still at war with each other at the con-
text index, which is not the case. The range for which non-existence of an index is
claimed has to be pragmatically restricted; cf. Partee 1973 for examples like I
didn’t turn off the stove. We can assume that the context provides a reference in-
terval, a history h before or reaching up to c, as a parameter. Realis and realis
negation then could be interpreted as follows:
(31) a. ⟦[Iº -m]⟧(c) = λiλi′λp[:h≤c  :∃i′∈h[p(i′)] [:h≤i :i′∈h p(i)]]
b. ⟦-re⟧(c) = λiλi′λp[:h≤c :¬∃i′∈h[p(i′)] [:h≤i :i′∈h ¬p(i′)]]
Recall that histories are intervals of indices, cf. (1b); h≤c holds if for all i∈h,
i≤c. Referring to histories in this way does not change the truth conditions for re-
alis-marked propositions, but affects propositions marked by realis negation.   
5 Potentialis -p / b(w)V
Potentialis modality is used in main clauses to express directive, cf. (32), horta-
tive, cf. (33), or commissive speech acts, cf. (34). 
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(32) ko-p sengane   de-re3 na-p ane.
2SG-POT give.TR   NRE-PART 1SG-POT eat.TR
‘Give me some of it so I can eat it.’ (Boa2.076)
(33) ngale do-p bá meleh byen soló.
then 1+2.DU-POT plant food because wedding.feast
‘After that, let’s plant food for the wedding.’ (Aiben7.009)
(34) na-p sengane suburu mane s-ok tuutuu man
1SG-POT give.TR mat to CL1-1SG grandparent male
‘I promise to give the mat to my grandfather’ (Aiben7.023)
These cases have in common that they refer to events that can be realized in
the future. They share this property with predictions about what will happen in the
future. However, such predictions are marked by a prefix a- on a potentialis sub-
ject marker, as seen in (21) and (35). Note that (35) does not express a promise,
but a prediction, as it is part of a monologue of the speaker. 
(35) li=malek a-na-p kuo a-na-p tinyam.
at=night FUT-1SG-POT run FUT-1SG-POT hide
‘At night, I will run and hide.’ personal story, (Abel3.079)
In embedded clauses, potentialis occurs in non-factive environments in which
the host proposition may become true, e.g. the expression of wishes, cf. (36), and
abilities, cf. (37). Potentialis clauses use the complementizer ka, like other non-re-
alis clauses. Notice that kiibele ‘to know’, which expresses a factive epistemic no-
tion in (9) and (17), also marks ability, similar to English to know that vs. to know
how. Irrealis clauses also occur in non-factive adjunct clauses, cf. (38).
(36) na-m  longbini  ka na-p pune pun-en soo
1S-RE want  CP.NR 1SG-POT tell tell-NOMIN IDEF
‘I want to tell a story’ (Andri2.002)
(37) ngale la-m kiibele ka  la-p  kuo soo~soo
then 3PL-RE able CP.NR 3PL-POT run one-REDUP
‘Then they were able to run away one by one.’ (Adam1.022)
(38) a-na-p ane  sówe bili ka   ot  bi mitmyet?
FUT-1SG-POT eat.TR  what time CP.NR  place  POT dark
‘What will I eat when it is dark?’ (JoeAlvi.028)
I propose to model potentialis as expressing that the host proposition is true at
some later index, and as presupposing the same, cf. (39). Consequently, poten-
3 In non-realis contexts, indefinites are marked by the prefix de-, expressing scopal dependence
on non-realis operators, and hence lack of existential import. Cf. also examples (55), (57).
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tialis presupposes that the host proposition can be realized, and that it cannot be
negated. Just as with realis, it needs a special type of negation, see Section 6. 
(39) a. ⟦bo⟧(c) = λiλi′λp [:∃i′[:i<i′ p(i′)] [:i<i′ p(i′)]]
b. ⟦[IP Enet [I′ bo [vP tEnet koliet]]]⟧(c) = λiλi′[:∃i′[i<i′ φ(i′)] [:i<i′ φ(i′)]]
An existentially closed CP based on a potentialis IP cannot be asserted. We
would get the meaning (40), which restricts the common ground C to those in-
dices that are followed by some index for which the host proposition is true. This
is too weak to be informative; it just states that φ can become true in principle.  
(40) ⟦[ForceP ASSERT [CP ∃ [IP Enet bo koliet]]]⟧(C)
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! [:∃i′[:c<i′ φ(i′)] ∃i′[:c<i′ φ(i′)]]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ∃i′[c<i′ ∧ φ(i′)]], cf. (3d,e,f)
Potentialis clauses can be used to express predictions in combination with the
prefix a-, cf. (35), (38). This prefix is derived from the nonrealis complementizer
ka, which is used in Daakaka. This justifies an analysis of a- as CP head, cf. (41).
(41) [CP Enet [C′ a- [IP bo [vP tEnet koliet]]]]
The prefix a- expresses a quantification over histories starting after an index i
that are deemed to be possible developments that the world might take, cf. Dowty
(1977). I assume for a- an accessibility relation FUT, cf. (42), where FUT(i)(h)
stands for: h is a history with i<h that is a plausible future at i, i.e. h does not con-
tain developments that run against expectations in i. We then get the interpretation
(43), where we use the functional notation, e.g. h(i′) stands for i′∈h.
(42) ⟦a-⟧(c) = λiλp∀h: FUT(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) p(i′)
(43) a. ⟦[CP Enet [C′ a- [IP bo [vP tEnet koliet]]]]⟧(c)
= λi[⟦a-⟧(c)(i)(⟦[IP bo [vP Enet koliet]]⟧(c)(i))]
= λi ∀h: FUT(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:∃i′[:i<i′ φ(i′)] [:i<i′ φ(i′)]]
= λi [:∃i′[i<i′ φ(i′)] ∀h: FUT(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:i<i′ φ(i′)]]
 = λi [:∃i′[i<i′ φ(i′)] ∀h: FUT(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)], as FUT(i)(h) entails i<h
b. ⟦[ForceP ASSERT [CP Enet abo koliet]]⟧(C)
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! [:∃i′[c<i′ φ(i′)] ∀h: FUT(c)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)]]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ∃i′[c<i′ ∧ φ(i′)] ∧ ∀h: FUT(c)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)]]
The future potentials proposition (43a) applies to indices i for which it holds
that all plausible future histories after i contain an index at which the host proposi-
tion – that Enet sings – is true. The potentialis presupposition that there is such a
future index projects, and is entailed by the non-presupposed part under the trivial
assumptions that there are future histories with respect to i. When asserted, cf.
(43b), this restricts the common ground C to indices c for which all future histo -
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ries relative to c make the host proposition true at some index or other. Notice that
from this representation we can derive that a- cannot combine with realis modal-
ity, as in *Enet a-mo koliet, as FUT(c)(h) implies c<h, which is not compatible
with the realis requirement that the host proposition is true at an index i′, i′≤c. Fol -
lowing Gajewski (2002), such structural contradictions result in ungrammaticality.
Directives, hortatives and commissives are analyzed are non-assertive speech
acts in which the speaker expresses a preference of certain histories over others.
We can model this by assuming a ForceP with an operator PREF: 
(44) [ForceP  PREF [IP Enet bo koliet]]
We can assume that a context comes with a preference set, PREF(c), a prop-
erty of histories that follow c and that are preferred as continuations of c. Prefer-
ence clauses restrict the preferred propositions, taking an IP, a propositional rela-
tion, not a CP, a proposition.
(45) ⟦PREF⟧(C) = λsλc[C(c) ∧ ! ∀h: PREF(c)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) s(c)(c)(i′)]
(46) ⟦[ForceP PREF [IP  Enet bo koliet]]]⟧(C)
= λsλc[C(c) ∧ ∀h: PREF(c)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) s(c)(c)(i′)](⟦[IP Enet bo koliet]⟧)
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! ∀h: PREF(c)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) ⟦[IP Enet bo koliet⟧(c)(c)(i′)]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! ∀h: PREF(c)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:∃i′[:c<i′ φ(i′)] [:c<i′ φ(i′)]]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ! [:∃i′[:c<i′ φ(i′)] ∀h: PREF(c)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)]]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ∃i′[c<i′ ∧ φ(i′)] ∧ ∀h: PREF(c)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)]
This restricts the preferred futures of c to those for which it holds that φ be-
comes true at some index, with the presupposition that φ actually may become
true at some index after c. This is a plausible interpretation of preferences, which
come with a condition of realizability – otherwise, distal or potentialis negation
would be used, see Sections 6 and 7 below.
I now turn to the use of potentialis in embedded clauses, which will be dis-
cussed with example (47); note the non-realis complementizer ka. 
(47) [IP Lising mo longbini [CP ka [IP Enet bo [tEnet koliet]]]]
‘Lising wants that Enet sings.’
I assume that the irrealis complementizer ka itself expresses a modal notion
with an accessibility relation R that, just like the cognate future marker a- and the
preference operator PREF, identifies a set of histories, as illustrated in (48).
(48) a. ⟦ka⟧(c) = λiλpλR ∀h: R(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) p(i′)
b. ⟦[CP ka [IP Enet bo tEnet koliet]]⟧(c)
= λi[⟦ka⟧(c)(i)(⟦[IP Enet bo tEnet koliet]⟧(c)(i))]
 = λiλR∀h: R(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) ! [:∃i′[:i<i′ φ(i′)] [:i<i′ φ(i′)]]
 = λiλR [:∃i′[:i<i′ φ(i′)] ∀h: R(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)]
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The accessibility relation R gets specified by the embedding verb longbini
‘want’, expressing buletic modality. This is rendered by the relation PREF(x),
where PREF(x)(i)(h) holds if h is a history after i that is preferred by person x at i:
(49) a. ⟦longbini⟧(c) = λiλRλx[R(PREF(x))(i)]
b. ⟦[longbini [CP ka Enet bo tEnet koliet]]⟧(c)
= λi[⟦longbini⟧(c)(i)(⟦[CP ka Enet bo tEnet koliet]⟧(c)(i))]
= λiλx [:∃i′[:i<i′ φ(i′)] ∀h: PREF(x)(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)]
c. ⟦[vP Lising [ longbini ka bo tEnet koliet]]⟧(c)
 = λi [:∃i′[:i<i′ φ(i′)] ∀h: PREF(Lising)(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)]
This vP can be turned into a realis proposition, and asserted, resulting in (50):
(50) ⟦[ForceP ASSERT [CP ∃ [IP Lising mo longbini ka Enet bo koliet]]]⟧(C)
= λc[C(c) ∧ ∃i[i≤c ∧ ∃i′[i<i′ ∧ φ(i′)] ∧ ∀h: PREF(Lising)(i)(h)∃i′:h(i′)φ(i′)]]]
This states that at an index i at or before c, the histories preferred by Lising at
i are such that the host proposition φ, that Enet sings, becomes true at some index.
In addition, φ indeed can become true after i, that is,  Lising does not have an un -
realistic preference. Counterfactual attitudes, indeed, are expressed with a differ -
ent modality, realis negation or distal. As before with predictions, the use of realis
modality in buletic clauses is excluded, as this would result in conflicting condi-
tions PREF(Lising)(i)(j), which entails i<h, and ∃i′: h(i′) [i′≤i ∧ …].
The expression of ability as in (51) is parallel to preferences, where the em-
bedding predicate identifies a modal relation ABLE(x)(i) that applies to the histo-
ries after i that are compatible with the abilities of x in i. That is, nothing happens
in those histories that imply an action of x that x is not capable of at i.
(51) [IP Enet mwi [vP tEnet  [VP kiibele [CP ka [IP tEnet [bo [vP tEnet koliet]]]]]]]
‘Enet is able to sing’, ‘Enet knows how to sing’
(52) λi [:∃i′[i<i′ φ(i′)] ∀h: ABLE(Enet)(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) φ(i′)]
The vP of (51) then is interpreted as in (52), which states that in all histories h
after the reference index i that correspond to Enet’s abilities at i, there is an index
i′ at which she sings. Within a branching world paradigm, this is a suitable repre-
sentation of abilities: If Enet looses her abilities to sing at some index i* after i,
then the indices after i* are not included in the histories that correspond to Enet’s
abilities at i. Also, notice that if Enet is able to sing at i it does not follow that
Enet will actually sing at some index after i – the course the world is taking can
follow for some while the histories in ABLE(Enet)(i), and then take a direction
outside of this histories.4 
4 The fact that Daakie kiibele, just like English know, expresses both doxastic and ability modals
is not explained by this representation; cf. Stanley 2011 for this combination.
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6 Potentialis negation: -n, ne
We have treated realis negation as expressing a presupposition that the host
proposition is false, and as stating that it is false. Hence realis negation could not
be used to express a prediction or a preference that a proposition will not become
true, or that the subject is unable to make the proposition true. For these cases,
Daakie employs a distinct modality, potentialis negation. 
The negative complementizer saka is used with potentialis negation for pre-
dictions, cf. (53), preferences, cf. (54), and epistemic clauses, cf. (55).
(53) sa=ka ne  lehe ngyo
CP.NEG PNEG  see 1.SG
‘He will not find me.’, personal story (Abel3.017)
(54) sa=ka ko-n lehe ngyo, saka na-n lehe ngyak
CP.NEG 2SG-PNEG see 1SG CP.NEG 1SG-PNEG see 2SG
‘Don’t look at me, I promise not to look at you’ (IB3.101)
(55) sa=ka ko-n lehe lokuo  de-soo
CP.NEG 2SG-PNEG see leaf  NRE-IDEF
‘You could not see any leaves’, description of eruption (Aeven4.081)
In dependent clauses, the N modality occurs in the scope of negated main clause 
verbs, cf. (56), or of verbs that imply a negation, cf. (57).
(56) na-re kiibele ka na-n teli
1SG-RNEG know CP.NR1SG-PNEG walk
‘I could not walk’, personal story (Boa1.084)
(57) na-m not=selaane ka  na-n gove-ne tiri  de-soo
1SG-RE think-wrongly CP.NR 1SG-PNEG do-TR something NR-IDEF
‘I was unable to do anything’, personal story (Boa1.47)
I propose that the N form is similar to the potentialis marker but comes with a
falsity  presupposition, cf. (58); hence the term “potentialis negation”.5
(58) ⟦[IP Enet [ne [vP tEnet koliet]]]⟧(c) 
= λiλi′ [:i<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]]
This expression contains a contradictory component [:¬Φ Φ], which requires a
negation to be resolved. It can be provided by the complementizer saka, cf. (59):
5 As Hedde Zeijlstra pointed out to me, this is related to the analysis of n-words like nessuno in
Italian by Alonso-Ovalle & Guerzoni (2004). According to their proposal, they are indefinites
that come with the conventional implicature that their host proposition is false, hence the
proposition requires a negation to become assertable. 
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(59) a. ⟦saka⟧(c) = λiλp ∀h: R(i)(h) ¬∃i′: h(i′) p(i′)
b. ⟦[CP  saka [IP Enet ne koliet]]⟧(c) 
= λi[⟦saka⟧(c)(i)(⟦[IP Enet ne koliet]⟧(c)(i))]
= λi ∀h: R(i)(h) ¬∃i′: h(i′) [:i<i′ :¬φ(i′)] φ(i′)]
= λi ∀h: R(i)(h) ∀i′: h(i′) [:i<i′ :¬φ(i′) ¬φ(i′)]
 = λi ∀h: R(i)(h) ∀i′: h(i′) [:i<i′ ∧ :¬φ(i′)], cf. (3d).
c. ⟦[ForceP ASSERT [CP saka [IP Enet ne koliet]]]⟧(c)
  = λc[C(c) ∧ ! ∀h: R(c)(h) ∀i′: h(i′) [:c<i′ ∧ :¬φ(i′)]]
= λc[C(c) ∧ ∀h: R(c)(h) ∀i′: h(i′) [c<i′ ∧ ¬φ(i′)]]
The relation R can be pragmatically specified by some accessibility relation,
e.g. prediction FUT, preference PREF, or an epistemic relation, cf. (53), (54), (55).
The condition c<i′ is trivially satisfied, as for all relations R with R(c)(h), h is a
history that starts with c. What is crucial is that the host proposition is claimed to
be false at all indices i′ of all such histories h. This results in meanings like ‘Enet
will not sing’, ‘Enet should not sing’, or ‘Enet could not have sung’. 
In embedded clauses, the negation that resolves the undefinedness of N-
marked clauses comes from the embedding predicate. I will show this for (60),
which is interpreted up to the IP level in (61). When asserted, we arrive at (62a). 
(60) [IP Enet tere [vP tEnet kiibele [CP ka [IP tEnet ne koliet]]]]
‘Enet was not able to sing.’
(61) a. ⟦[CP ka [IP tEnet ne koliet]]⟧(c)
= λi[⟦ka⟧(c)(i)(⟦[IP tEnet ne koliet]⟧(c)(i))]
= λiλR∀h:R(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:i<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]
b. ⟦[vP tEnet kiibele [IP ka [CP [IP tEnet ne koliet]]]⟧(c)
 = λi∀h:ABLE(Enet)(i)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:i<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]
c. ⟦[IP Enet tere [vP tEnet kiibele [CP ka [IP tEnet ne koliet]]]⟧(c)
= λiλi″[: ¬∃i″≤c ∀h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]
 [i″≤i ∧ ¬∀h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]]]
(62) a. ⟦[ForceP ASSERT [CP ∃ [IP Enet tere kiibele ka ne koliet]]]⟧(C)
 = λc[C(c) ∧ ![: ¬∃i″≤c ∀h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]
 ∃i″[i″≤c ∧ ¬∀h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]]]]
b. = λc[C(c) ∧ ![:∀i″≤c ¬∀h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∃i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]
 ∃i″[i″≤c ∧ ∃h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ¬∃i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]]]
c. = λc[C(c) ∧ ![:∀i″≤c ∃h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ¬∃i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ :¬φ(i′) φ(i′)]
 ∃i″[i″≤c ∧ ∃h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∀i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ :¬φ(i′) ¬φ(i′)]]]
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d. = λc[C(c) ∧ ![:∀i″≤c ∃h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∀i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ ∧ :¬φ(i′)]
 ∃i″[i″≤c ∧ ∃h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∀i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ ∧ :¬φ(i′)]]]
e. = λc[C(c) ∧ ![:∀i″≤c ∃h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∀i′: h(i′) [:i″<i′ ∧ :¬φ(i′)]]]
f. = λc[C(c) ∧ ![:∀i″≤c [:∀h:ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∀i′: h(i′)[i″<i′ ∧ ¬φ(i′)]
                    ∃h: ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∀i′: h(i′)[i″<i′ ∧ ¬φ(i′)]]]
g. = λc[C(c) ∧ ∀i″≤c ∀h:ABLE(Enet)(i″)(h) ∀i′: h(i′)[i″<i′ ∧ ¬φ(i′)]
We get from (62a) to (b) by the equivalences ¬∃i″...∀h... ≡ ∀i″... ¬∀h... and
¬∀h:...∃i′... ≡ ∃h:...¬∃i′..., and similarly to (c) and (d). The negation “trickles
down” to the N-marked IP, resolving the contradiction between presupposition
and host proposition. The simplification (e) is possible as the presupposition en -
tails the non-presupposed part. In (f), the presupposition in the scope of ∃h:... is
projected, following (5b). This leads to the proper interpretation that for all histo -
ries h that represent the abilities of Enet at any index i″ at or before c, h does not
contain an index of Enet singing. The projection rule for presuppositions (5b) is
essential for turning the existential negation of the embedding clause into a uni -
versal negation. For negative-implying verbs like notselaane ‘to think wrongly’
we would have to assume negation as part of the lexical-semantic representation. 
7 Distal -t / t(V)
The distal form is used as a temporal scene setter, either as an independent clause
for the following discourse, cf. (63), or as an adjunct clause, cf. (64). 
(63) meerin témat la-t pwee
long.ago zombies 3PL-DST be.many
‘Long ago, there were many zombies.’ (Boa3.025)
(64) yaa te van te pwet  ti piipili mwe kuoli=mee tyenem
[sun DST go DST PROG  DST red] RE return=come home
‘When the sun became red (in the evening), he went home’ (Ilson2.021)
The distal occurs in complement clauses embedded by propositional attitude
verbs when it is implicated that they are in fact false, cf. (65), (66).
(65) kye-m deme  ka te we mee gon ngi-ye
3PC-RE think  CP.NR DST fruit.TR dragonplum FOC FOC-PROX
‘They thought that they were just dragonplum fruits’ (Wili1.030)
(66) mo gotó-ne ka  te mese baabap ten
RE make-TR CP.NR DST sick very much
‘He pretended to be very sick’, translation (Aesop094)
580
Krifka
I propose that the distal expresses no relation between event and reference in -
dex, with the possible exception that the event index cannot be the context. 
(67) a. ⟦-t⟧(c) = λiλi′λp[:i′≠c p(i′)]
b. ⟦[IP Enet te koliet]⟧(c) = λiλi′[:i′≠c φ(i′)]
In distal main clauses as in (63), the relation between event time and reference
time is restricted by a temporal adverbial, preferably meerin ‘long time ago’; this
also sets an anaphoric anchor for the event index of the following clauses. 
(68) ⟦[IP meerin [IP Enet te koliet]]⟧(c)
= λiλi′[⟦meerin⟧(c)(i)(i′) ∧ ⟦[IP Enet te koliet]⟧(c)(i)(i′)]
= λiλi′[i′ << c ∧ [:i′≠c φ(i′)]] (with i′ a topic time for following clauses)
In (68), the topic time is specified within a clause. I assume that such specifi-
cations of topic times are presupposed. We will discuss this with example (69).
(69) [ForceP ASSERT [CP ∃ [[IP Enet te koliet] [IP Lising mwe sap]]]
‘When Enet sang, Lising was dancing.’
The distal clause indicates the topic time. This can be interpreted by a con -
junction of two propositional relations, as in (70). It is the event indices of the two
clauses that are related to each other, not the reference indices, hence the relation
between the indices are expressed within the IP. After existential closure and as -
sertion at C, we arrive at the common ground (71).
(70) ⟦[IP [IP Enet te koliet] [IP Lising mwe sap]]⟧(c)
= λiλi′[:⟦[IP Enet te koliet]⟧(c)(i)(i′) ∧ ⟦[IP Lising mwe sap]⟧(c)(i)(i′)]
= λiλi′[:[:i′≠c ∧ φ(i′)] ∧ [:∃i′[i′≤c ∧ ψ(i′)] [:i′≤i ψ(i′)]]]
= λiλi′[:i′<i :φ(i′) :∃i′[i′≤c ∧ ψ(i′)] ψ(i′)]
(71) ⟦(68)⟧(C) = λc[C(c) ∧ ∃i′[i′<c ∧ φ(i′) ∧ ψ(i′)]]
We turn to distal modality in embedded clauses, which I will discuss with ex-
ample (72). The embedding predicate deme expresses a doxastic accessibility rela-
tion for histories, where DOX(x)(i)(h) holds if h is a history in which nothing hap-
pens that is contrary to the beliefs of x at h. In contrast to DOX(x)(i)(i′) for
kiibele, cf. (20), this is not understood as a belief about the index i. This leads to
interpretation in (73). Crucially, deme does not introduce a factivity presupposi-
tion, different from kiibele. This makes embedded distal clauses applicable in
cases in which they are in fact not true, as in (65) and (66).
(72) [IP Lising mwe [vP tLising deme [CP ka [IP Enet te koliet]]]].
‘Lising thinks/thought that Enet is singing/was singing/will be singing’
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(73) a. ⟦[CP ka [IP Enet te koliet]]⟧(c)
 = λi[⟦ka⟧(c)(i)(⟦[IP Enet te koliet]⟧(c)(i))]
 = λi[λpλR∀h: R(i)(h) ∃i′:h(i′) p(i′)](λi′[:i′≠c φ(i′)])]
 = λiλR∀h: R(i)(h) ∃i′:h(i′) [:i′≠c φ(i′)]
b. ⟦[vP Lising deme [ka [IP Enet te koliet]]]⟧(c)
= λi ∀h: DOX(Lising)(i)(h) ∃i′:h(i′) [:i′≠c φ(i′)]
Distal is also used to express the protasis of conditional clauses. In the apo-
dosis, we find either potentialis or, in the case of counterfactuals, the marker a +
distal, as in examples (74) and (75) that simulate a situation in which the ad-
dressee places a bet by choosing between one of two fruits.
(74) ko-t pyak  soro ka   tu wuo, a-ko-p idi popat.
2SG-DST choose reach CR.NR  DST good FUT-2SG-POT take pig
‘In case you choose well, you will win a pig.’ (elicited)
(75) ka ko-t pyak-ne vih, a-ko-t idi popat
CR.NR 2SG-DST choose-TR banana FUT-2SG-DST take pig
 ‘If you had chosen the banana, you would have won the pig.’ (elicited)
We arrive at a suitable interpretation when the quantification expressed by the
future marker a- and the complementizer k a is restricted to those indices for
which the sentence is defined (cf. (2)(b) for $), as in (76), where R is FUT for a-.
(76) ⟦(k)a-⟧(c) = λi λr ∀h: [R(i)(h) ∧  ∃i′: h(i′) $ r(i)(i′)] ∃i′: h(i′) r(i)(i′)
Example (74) is illustrated by (77), meaning ‘if Enet sings, Lising will dance’.
FUT(i) is restricted to histories for which the presuppositions are satisfied; this
means crucially those histories for which the te clause holds. We get an “indica-
tive” conditional, as the apodosis can become true due to its potentialis marking.
(77) ⟦[CP [IP Enet te koliet]i [CP Lising [C′ a- [IP ti [IP tLising be sap]]]]]⟧(c)
= λi[⟦a-⟧(c)(i)(⟦[IP [IP Enet te koliet] [IP Lising be sap]]⟧(c))]
= λi ∀h: [FUT(i)(h) ∧ ∃i′: h(i′) $ [:i′≠c :φ(i′) :∃i′[i<i′ ∧ ψ(i′)] ψ(i′)]]
 ∃i′: h(i′) [:i′≠c :φ(i′) :∃i′[i<i′ ∧ ψ(i′)] ψ(i′)]
= λi [:∃i′[i<i′ ∧ ψ(i′)] ∀h: [FUT(i)(h) ∧ ∃i′:h(i′) [i′≠c ∧ φ(i′) ∧ ∃i′[i<i′ ∧ ψ(i′)]]]
                         ∃i′: h(i′) [:i′≠c :φ(i′) ψ(i′)]]
Example (75) can be interpreted as illustrated by (78), meaning ‘if Enet had
sung, Lising would have danced’. The apodosis carries a distal marking, hence an
interpretation that does not presuppose that it may become true, which makes it
similar to a counterfactual conditional. The representation takes a- to be a separate
modal marker for future, and simplifies a bit for reasons of space. The resulting
proposition applies to indices i (= c) such that every history h compatible with the
accessibility relation R for which there is an index i′ at which Enet sings is also a
582
Krifka
history for which there is an index i′ at which Enet sings that is predicted to have
a subsequent index i″ at which Lising dances.
(78) ⟦[CP [ka [IP [IP Enet te koliet] [CP Lising a- [IP tLising te sap]]]]⟧(c)
= λi[⟦ka⟧(c)(λi′[:⟦[IP Enet te koliet]⟧(c)(i)(i′)(⟦[CP Lising a-te sap]⟧(c)(i′))]
= λi ∀h: [R(i)(h) ∧ ∃i′: h(i′) $ [:φ(i′) ∀h′: FUT(i′)(h′) ∃i″: h′(i″) ψ(i″)]]
    ∃i′: h(i′) [:φ(i′) ∀h′: FUT(i′)(h′) ∃i″: h′(i″) ψ(i″)]
= λi ∀h: [R(i)(h) ∧ ∃i′: [h(i′) ∧ φ(i′)]] 
  ∃i′: h(i′) [:φ(i′) ∀h′: FUT(i′)(h′) ∃i″: h(i″) ψ(i″)]
While the distal is a relatively rare marker, it is semantically the least speci -
fied, and hence can be used in case the conditions for realis and potentials would
not be met because they would introduce unwarranted presuppositions. 
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